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Until Al Gore came to his door in 2006, Richard Branson had not been greatly troubled 
by the prospect of climate change. But, on that day he experienced his ‘Road to 
Damascus’ (Branson, 2007a). Nothing, he reflects  
“wakes one up more to the issues at hand than the former vice president of the 
USA coming all the way to your home in London to give a personal lecture on 
global warming. … Looking directly at me, he said, “Richard, you and Virgin 
are icons of originality and innovation. You can help to lead the way in dealing 
with climate change. It has to be done from the top down, instead of from the 
bottom up on a grassroots level (Branson 2007 a,b)’”. 
Listening to Gore’s lecture, the Virgin tycoon came to see that drastic cuts in greenhouse 
gas emissions are imperative or ‘in a very short space of time most of the Earth will be 
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uninhabitable’ (Branson 2007a). Acting swiftly upon this epiphany, he launched a 
$25 million prize for the originator of the most convincing invention for actively 
absorbing and storing CO2. His company now pioneers a new approach to marrying the 
needs of business and the environment, which Branson dubs ‘Gaia Capitalism.’ 
Branson is unusually adept in the arts of self-dramatisation and headline-grabbing but 
his conversion belongs to a wider trend, the green revolution in the boardrooms of blue-
chip corporations. Scarcely, a week goes by without media reports of new climate-change 
mitigation strategies and achievements. In 2007, Virgin was joined by HSBC, which 
announced that it had attained ‘carbon neutrality,’ by Barclaycard, which donates half the 
profits of a new credit card to projects that tackle climate change, and many more. ‘Big 
companies from BSkyB to the banks and the oil majors,’ commented the Guardian, ‘have 
been vying to underline their green credentials and portray themselves as caring, sharing 
protectors of the planet’1. The green shift is mirrored within business institutions. The 
new head of the Confederation of British Industry, according to Jonathon Porrit, ‘talks 
about climate change in a very different way from his predecessor, Digby Jones. Ben 
Verwaayen, chief executive of BT, now chairs the CBI’s taskforce on climate change and 
hopes are high that its recommendations will drag the CBI membership into something 
vaguely resembling reality’2. Even the chief sponsor of climate-change denial has begun 
to shift. ‘The US and European institutional investors worth $700bn,’ the Financial Times 
revealed, led a charge ‘to oust an Exxon board member for ‘inaction’ on climate change.’ 
The ExxonMobil executive had repeatedly refused to discuss the company’s controversial 
climate strategy with them. They intended, the investors announced, to support 
shareholder resolutions requesting specific emissions reduction goals and higher 
spending on renewables3. 
For some analysts, these developments amount to a ‘corporate climate change 
campaign’4. Noble (2007) draws attention to the mushrooming of institutions devoted to 
lobbying for business-friendly climate change regulation. One such is the Business 
Environmental Council, which emphasises that 
“climate change should be dealt with through ‘market-based mechanisms’ and 
by adopting ‘reasonable policies,’ and expressed the belief ‘that companies 
taking early action on climate strategies and policy will gain sustained 
competitive advantage over their peers.” 
Another is the Partnership for Climate Action, the purpose of which is, in its words, ‘to 
champion market-based mechanisms as a means of achieving early and credible action on 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions that is efficient and cost-effective.’ These were joined 
more recently by the US. Climate Action Partnership, whose ‘Call for Action’ identifies 
the ‘urgent need for a policy framework on climate change’ and emphasises that ‘a 
mandatory system is needed that sets clear, predictable, market-based requirements to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.’ 
In this article, I examine the corporate green shift. I summarise the emissions 
reduction strategies of four corporations: BP, Marks & Spencer (M&S), Tesco and 
Virgin. For each, I outline their action plan and, where pertinent, the claims made for it 
by company spokespeople, and then proceed to analysis and critique. The sample is 
selected according to two criteria: it includes large corporations, which unambiguously 
position themselves as environmental pioneers. All four were rated by consumers as 
among the ‘top twenty’ green firms in a recent survey5. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    ‘Green shift’: an analysis of corporate responses to climate change 3    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
1 Climate-change strategies: BP, Marks & Spencer, Tesco and Virgin 
From 1995 to 2007, BP’s CEO was John Browne, who frequently professed an urgent 
concern for global warming (‘climate change is a risk we cannot ignore – We have to act 
now’)6. Under Browne’s leadership the company renamed itself ‘Beyond Petroleum,’ 
adopted its distinctive sunflower logo, and promised not to invest in oil extraction from 
tar sands. In addition to research and lobbying, BP’s climate-change strategy has four 
planks: renewables, biofuels, carbon sequestration and offsets. 
Renewables. BP is one of the world’s largest producers of solar photovoltaics. It intends 
to invest $8 billion over the next ten years in renewable energies. 
Biofuels. In Britain, BP is ramping up biofuel production, with a new plant that will use 
some of what it terms Britain’s ‘wheat surplus,’ producing fuel with CO2 emissions at 
least 40% lower than fossil equivalents. It is funding research on biofuel feedstocks by 
Mendel Biotechnology. It has established a demonstration project for jatropha, a bio-
feedstock, and a bio-diesel refinery, and plans to invest approximately $160m in a joint 
venture with biofuels firm D1 Oils, to include the creation of over one million hectares of 
jatropha plantations in India and Africa7. 
Carbon sequestration. In Algeria, BP operates a CO2 capture and storage project that will 
‘decarbonise’ natural gas, releasing hydrogen for use in power production. The captured 
CO2 is injected into geological reservoirs. 
Offsets. BP has invested in a variety of offset projects. Its website recently highlighted 
one such scheme for trapping and burning the methane emissions from pig farms in 
Mexico, equating to the emissions of 750,000 cars per year. 
The next two companies are in the retail sector, beginning with M&S. Consumers’ 
decisions, according to its Head of Corporate Social Responsibility, are increasingly 
motivated by ‘ethical’ concerns. Internal research indicates that, whereas ‘Four years ago 
50% of customers said it mattered to them that M&S was a responsible business, by last 
year that proportion had grown to 97%’8. The company has committed to numerous green 
initiatives, including reduced packaging, manufacturing fleecy jackets from recycled 
plastic bottles and launching a ‘Carbon Challenge’ with the Women’s Institute and World 
Wildlife Fund to help customers reduce their carbon emissions. But, its key climate 
change commitments can be grouped under five headings. 
Renewables. M&S pledges to ‘maximise our use of renewable energy,’ including the goal 
of ‘powering all our UK with green energy from a variety of sources, including 
‘anaerobic digestion’’. 
Biofuels. M&S promises to ban petrol-fuelled company cars and to ensure that ‘all our 
lorries run on at least 50% bio-diesel.’ 
Localisation. M&S is committed to sourcing ‘as much food from Britain and Ireland as 
we can and to setting targets ‘to reduce the amount of food we import by air.’ 
Labelling. M&S plans to introduce carbon labelling, spelling out the ‘carbon cost’ of 
products. It will put an aeroplane symbol on air-freighted food products. 
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Offsetting. In its ‘Five-Year Plan’ announced in 2007, M&S declares that it will buy 
carbon offsets ‘as a last resort where no green alternative exists’ – for example with 
airplane fuel and home furniture deliveries. 
As a result of these and other measures in its green ‘Five-Year Plan’ – which M&S 
estimates will cost £200 million over five years – the company hopes to become carbon 
neutral by 2012 and to be recognised as Britain’s ‘greenest retailer.’ That crown is, 
needless to say, disputed by other chains, including Tesco. 
Tesco’s key commitments can be summarised under four headings: 
Energy efficiency. The company promises that a range of measures will halve its energy 
use per square foot between 2000 and 2010. 
Renewables. Tesco is to inject £100m into experimental projects to supply energy to its 
stores from wind turbines, solar panels, geothermal power and gasification (power from 
waste food)9. 
Biofuels. Tesco has acquired a major stake in Greenergy, a leading biofuels producer, and 
intends to convert its entire distribution fleet to bio-diesel. It already uses 5% biofuel in 
its petrol at 185 filling stations. 
Labelling. Tesco plans to publish a ‘carbon count’ on its packaging. 
Virgin’s strategy can be summed up in one word: technology. One thinks of Branson’s 
prize, and Virgin Atlantic’s recent purchase of new, less fuel-inefficient, Boeing 787s. 
Then, there is Branson’s advocacy of nuclear power as a low-carbon energy source, and 
his suggestion that his space-tourism enterprise, Virgin Galactic, may help with its 
shortcomings (‘The biggest problem with nuclear power is knowing how to deal with the 
waste. Maybe if our space programme gets going we could send it off into the sun …’)10. 
But, the technology upon which Virgin bets by far its highest stakes is biofuel. Entering 
this sector, writes Branson (2007b), offers hope for the climate and ‘should be a good 
business move – investing in [biofuels] puts pressure on fossil fuel prices and acts as a 
hedge for our airline and train companies.’ In 2007, when headlines announced ‘Branson 
to invest $3bn to fight global warming’ they were referring to investment in biofuel 
development and production. Virgin had already announced its backing for a California-
based bio-ethanol producer, Cilion, and this was followed by the launch of Virgin Fuels, 
which plans to invest up to $400 m in bio-fuel projects11. Virgin Trains include bio-diesel 
in their fuel mix, while Virgin Atlantic is to form an alliance with Boeing and General 
Electric to develop biofuels for aero engines. In this, Virgin hopes to achieve commercial 
viability within five years, and has already succeeded in flying a plane on a fuel mix that 
included some biofuel. For these initiatives Branson has received widespread acclaim, 
notably in Nicholas Stern’s (2007) ‘Economics of Climate Change’ Review, and in 2007, 
‘Concerned Consumers Survey’ Virgin Atlantic scored highest, on the question of green 
credentials, of the five airlines listed12. 
2 Analysis: BP, Marks & Spencer, Tesco and Virgin 
Such are the strategies. I turn now to examine their efficacy. Which of them consist 
mainly of spin and exaggeration, and which will make a real impact? 
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For BP, it is appropriate to put its mitigation strategies in perspective through 
comparison with its responsibility for generating climate change. Together with Shell, 
the company accounts for an astounding 40% of the CO2 emissions of all FTSE100 
companies13. Yet, of its new investment, only 2–3% goes on renewables. Its investment 
in biofuels in Britain will supply about a third of that country’s total demand by the end 
of the decade and may or may not contribute to climate change – this issue is analysed 
below – but either way the sum involved represents ‘petty cash’ for a company of its size, 
according to the Financial Times14. On offsets, BP has recently been accused of 
exaggerating cuts in emissions from Mexican pig farms: the methane savings, it turns out, 
will be a small fraction of the predicted levels. BP admits the anticipated savings ‘will not 
be reached’ and has corrected the claims on its website15. As regards carbon 
sequestration, critics point out that it is expensive, and perceived as potentially viable 
only because the CO2 extracted is injected into depleted oil fields in order to pump more 
oil, releasing even more CO2. The procedure is also risky. ‘If we put this stuff away for 
thousands of years,’ wonders Nick Riley of the British Geological Survey (McGarr, 
2005), ‘then what happens if it leaks?’ BP has retreated from its earlier promise, and will 
be investing nearly £1.5 billion in a joint venture to produce oil from Canadian tar sands. 
Extracted using high-temperature steam, this oil is upto five times more energy-intensive 
than traditional forms of production. ‘By jumping into tar sands extraction,’ a Greenpeace 
Canada spokesperson told the Independent (Milmo, 2007), BP ‘is taking part in the 
biggest global warming crime ever seen and its green sheen is gone.’ Finally, on public 
policy, BP’s claims to exert a positive influence are open to challenge. In the USA, the 
oil giant has actually lobbied to block legislation to introduce curbs on GHG emissions 
(Harriss-White and Harris, 2007). It is unquestionably a key player in carbon trading 
policy formation, but the efficacy of such schemes is questionable, as will be discussed 
below. 
For M&S, its Five-Year Plan has been widely acclaimed. The campaigns director of 
Greenpeace UK enthuses that ‘if every retailer in Britain followed M&S’s lead it would 
be a major step forward in meeting the challenge of creating a sustainable society’16. It 
does undoubtedly mark a strategic shift, yet it can scarcely be described as major: the cost 
over five years will be less than 0.5% of just one year’s turnover. M&S’s primary 
commitment, biofuels, will be discussed below; here I concentrate on two others: 
offsetting and labelling. 
Offsetting is utilised by businesses (like BP) whose profit margins depend upon 
delaying a transition to a low-carbon economy for as long as possible and by those (like 
M&S) for which an ‘ethical’ profile matters. The best that can be said of it is that it 
enables some projects – e.g. in renewable energy – to become viable that otherwise may 
not be; plus, it may bring extra investment to poor countries. Its shortcomings, however, 
are legion. Offset schemes are virtually unregulated, and different companies quote 
sharply divergent prices for offsetting the same quantity of emissions. Much offsetting 
involves funding energy efficiency projects, which begs the question: would these 
improvements not have occurred anyway? One investigation of offsetting within the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM; a carbon trading system to be discussed below), 
exposed the case of a giant steel mill, run by an Indian company, Jindal (Davies, 2007): 
“It had put forward three separate projects, all of which would capture waste 
heat and funnel it back into the mill as a source of energy. But the company 
insisted it could afford to do this only if the scheme was accepted by the CDM. 
[An advisor to the CDM board], however, found the mill had decided to do this 
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years earlier and accused Jindal of making statements which were ‘blatantly 
wrong’. He warned the CDM board that the evidence showed Jindal would 
have gone ahead with the three schemes on purely commercial grounds and 
were, he reported, ‘clearly nonadditional’. But the board accepted the projects 
whose supposed cuts in carbon emissions are now being used to allow extra 
emissions, mostly in Europe”. 
The other typical offset scheme is forestry. Trees do absorb CO2, yet at a low level 
relative to fossil-fuel emissions: in order to absorb just the USA’s current CO2 emissions 
31% of that country would have to be planted with new forest (Warr, 2006). Forest cover, 
being less reflective than other forms of land surface, traps extra heat (except, to a small 
extent, in the tropics). Tree planting requires land draining and clearance, releasing 
carbon. Most new forests are monocultures, requiring high water, fertiliser and pesticide 
inputs to thrive. Moreover, for carbon to be fixed permanently the ‘offsetting’ trees must 
not die and rot, or burn; and if protected from loggers these must not be displaced to 
another forest. 
Offsetting, critics contend, offers high-polluting industries the opportunity to 
‘greenwash’ their activities. The schemes involve financing projects that are in any case 
necessary; they typically involve exploiting the North–South emissions and incomes 
gaps: companies in the North increase emissions, but assuage their critics and corporate 
consciences by paying for cheap emissions reduction projects in the South. In essence, 
this amounts to ‘offsetting’ developed-world pollution against the underdevelopment of 
others17. The overall effect of offsetting is to legitimise carbon emissions – a truth that is 
expertly satirised by cheatneutral.com, a website that offers disloyal partners the prospect 
of offsetting their infidelities by paying money to couples who pledge to stay faithful 
(‘First you should look at ways of reducing your cheating. Once you have done this you 
can use Cheatneutral to offset the remaining, unavoidable cheating’). 
As with offsetting, labelling may produce a small effect, at the margin. Yet, even this 
initiative has significant drawbacks. If customers are ignorant when information is scarce 
the provision of additional statistics for each product may merely induce bewilderment 
and paralysis. Carbon footprints are notoriously difficult to measure. (Should, for 
example, that of a bottle of orange juice includes the nitrous oxide – a greenhouse gas 
300 times more potent than CO2 – emitted by artificial fertilisation of the oranges?) In 
addition, many consumers show little trust towards corporations. One recent survey of 
over 2,700 people in Britain and America suggests that the recent wave of corporate 
greenery will have little impact on consumers ‘because nine out of 10 consumers are 
sceptical’ about the information they receive from companies and governments (This 
contrasts with 60% who trust scientists and almost half who put the same faith in 
environmental groups)18. But, the most important limitation of labelling is that all but the 
wealthiest consumers are aware that as individual consumers their influence is negligible. 
This problem will actually be exacerbated by carbon labelling, for it represents an attempt 
by corporations to delegate responsibility for combating climate change to individuals. 
This, Heather Rogers suggests (2007), should be understood in the light of past business-
led campaigns against litter and for recycling. The latter campaign, she writes, served to 
‘ingrain a sense of personal culpability for increasing levels of trash … the rhetoric of 
recycling targeted individual behaviour as the key to the garbage problem, steering public 
debate away from the regulation of production.’ The current discussion of individual 
‘carbon footprints’ – to which carbon labelling belongs – is an extension of the same 
tendency. 
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As for Tesco, its commitment to halving its energy use per square foot by 50% may 
be laudable, but given its outlets’ rapidly expanding acreage the results are less 
impressive in absolute terms. Moreover, the degree to which energy efficiency initiatives 
are genuinely ‘green’ is open to question. In a widely cited article entitled ‘green is the 
new black,’ Tesco’s CEO Terry Leahy (2007) claims that they are. The article addresses 
the question (as phrased – hardly impartially – by Leahy): ‘‘Why now? Why has Tesco 
suddenly taken on a role as a leader in the environmental debate? Isn’t this all just 
opportunism, or ‘greenwash’?’ His argument, in essence, is that the key techniques of 
mitigating climate change are identical with those designed to reduce energy and 
materials costs. Tesco, he concludes, 
“has been getting greener for years …, [after all,] there are sound commercial 
reasons for cutting energy consumption in stores, reducing fuel consumption in 
distribution and getting rid of excess packaging, and we’d be doing many of 
these things even if we had no concern for the environment at all”. 
Although Leahy’s avowed intention is to counter accusations of ‘greenwash,’ in 
admitting that Tesco would ‘be doing many of these things even if it had no concern for 
the environment at all’ he gives the game away, effectively conceding the argument to 
those critics who accuse his firm of painting actions taken for ‘sound commercial 
reasons’ green in order to pre-empt pressure to introduce measures that, while seriously 
addressing climate change, could impair profitability. 
The principal shortcoming of Tesco’s strategy, however, is that it does not address 
transport, except through use of biofuels19. Tesco and its cousins have developed an 
exceedingly fuel-intensive business model involving centralised distribution networks, 
meaning that produce is trucked up and down the country from big warehouses. 
(Vegetables in its stores travel an average 600 miles before they reach the customer). 
Tesco’s trucks clock 68 million miles each year, with rail transportation of goods only 
1.2% of this. In addition, it air freights millions of tonnes of products around the world. 
Tesco supports industrial – fossil fuel-intensive – agriculture; and its stores are located to 
facilitate access by car – many are out of town. As Tesco expands, smaller local shops 
shut down, forcing customers to drive further. When this model was threatened by a 
government proposal for a tax on out-of-town parking, Tesco rounded on and defeated 
the proposal. A final limitation of Tesco’s strategy – and indeed of the other firms under 
discussion – is that the promises are not copper-bottomed. As George Monbiot points out, 
in an open letter to Terry Leahy, ‘At no point in your [Corporate Responsibility Review] 
do you explain which – if any – of the cuts you list have been independently audited. 
Without auditing, we have no guarantee that your claims are anything but spin’20. 
Finally, we come to Virgin. Few developments symbolise the corporate green shift 
better than Branson’s damascene conversion to ‘Gaia Capitalism’. Of the tools with 
which Virgin proposes to tackle climate change, the one that has hit the headlines is the 
‘Earth Challenge’ prize: to be awarded to any individual or group developing a 
commercially viable technology capable of removing CO2 and other greenhouse gases at 
the rate of at least one billion tons per annum over a decade. So far, two technologies 
appear to be serious candidates. One is the so-called ‘synthetic tree,’ that would use 
caustic soda to filter CO2 out of the air; its inventor estimates that 250,000 such trees 
would be needed to soak up the CO2produced worldwide annually. The other is seeding 
relatively lifeless parts of the oceans with iron filings (or urea) to stimulate phytoplankton 
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growth. About 25% of the carbon absorbed, its advocates predict, would sink to the 
bottom. 
Yet both of these technological fixes face major obstacles. Assuming it ever leaves 
the drawing board, the major obstacle facing synthetic trees would be the energy 
expended in creating and processing the chemicals (the second law of thermodynamics 
springs to mind). Massachusetts Institute of Technology engineer Howard Herzog 
estimates that this alone would make the trees unviable21. As to ocean seeding, scientists 
have cast doubt on the prediction of 25% absorption. Empirically, the small-scale open-
ocean trials that have been conducted to date have not demonstrated sequestration into 
the deep ocean. Rather, they found that zooplankton multiplied too, consuming the 
phytoplankton and releasing CO2. In addition, the danger is that it would produce 
massive unwanted side effects in marine ecosystems. If iron seeding were to go 
commercial, scientists warn, it ‘could cause substantial harm to the ocean ecosystem and 
may even reduce its ability to sequester carbon’22. A further problem, highlighted in 
Nature by Irina Marinov and colleagues, is that stimulating phytoplankton production in 
one part of the ocean can act to depress it elsewhere23. 
Regrettably, the likelihood of a technology being devised that would allow extraction 
of greenhouse gases from the atmosphere rapidly enough and in volumes of sufficient 
magnitude to significantly restrict climate change is minimal. For technological fixes in 
general, the hazard is that they create a costly smokescreen for continued reliance on 
fossil fuels and divert funds from investment in proven technologies such as renewable 
energy, building insulation and public transport. This provides a clue as to why Branson, 
of all billionaires, is the one to step forth with his prize: not one of the technologies and 
domains just listed applies to aviation. The Earth Challenge initiative ‘may hold 
particular appeal in the aviation industry as there really are no other viable, cleaner fuels 
in the pipeline,’ suggests Steve Rayner, a professor of science and civilisation at Oxford 
University. ‘I think that’s why Branson has latched onto this’24. A technological magic 
bullet would allow airlines to continue business as usual; failing that, the prize justifies 
Virgin’s continued investments in air travel expansion on the grounds that Branson at 
least is generously funding the search for solutions. 
Branson is explicit that his strategy demands faster growth of his airline business. Is 
this not paradoxical? Surely, the continued fast growth in air travel cannot be maintained 
‘without causing climatic disaster’ – a quote from Friends of the Earth, the inclusion of 
which on Virgin Atlantic’s website can only be described as facile25. Branson’s guiding 
assumption is that only politicians and business leaders can act effectively to mitigate 
climate change; therefore, being an environmentally conscious citizen, his position as 
wealthy entrepreneur must be maintained. ‘I can hear people saying,’ he writes (2007b), 
“If CO2 emissions are the problem, why doesn’t Richard Branson just stop his planes 
from flying?’ But … if we stopped, we’d leave a gap that somebody who might have no 
sense of responsibility at all would fill.” This vision, Monbiot has remarked, depending 
as it does on the expansion of Virgin Atlantic, can be paraphrased as ‘we must destroy 
the planet in order to save it’26. 
The Earth Challenge prize, one should concede, is dwarfed by Virgin’s biofuels 
ventures. And what if biofuels proved to be Branson’s desired magic bullet? Monbiot’s 
jab could then be shrugged off. Sadly, this is improbable. For one thing, their viability as 
a jet fuel is open to doubt. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change asserts that 
‘there would not appear to be any practical alternatives to kerosene-based fuels for 
commercial jet aircraft for the next several decades’27. Branson places his hopes in 
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ethanol, but this has a flashpoint of 12°C, which ‘would present major safety dangers,’ 
according to researchers at Imperial College, London28. In addition, it releases 
acetaldehyde at low power settings, ‘bringing localised health problems around airports, 
especially for ground support staff.’ Nor is bio-diesel suitable: at low temperatures, it 
turns cloudy or even forms a gel, blocking fuel filters and fuel lines. It is true that in 
February 2008 one Virgin Atlantic flight did include what Branson calls ‘sustainable 
biofuel’ in its fuel mix: 20% of the fuel of one of its four engines was made from the oil 
of coconuts and wild-growing babassu29. But one wonders, how ‘sustainable’ is this? 
Even leaving to one side the difficulties of flying on a 100% biofuel mix, were this 
possible, three million coconuts would be needed to fly just one aeroplane from London 
to Amsterdam. Yet 1,300 flights leave London’s Heathrow airport each day. If all were 
biofuelled they would consume the oil of three billion coconuts (plus an indeterminate 
amount of babassu oil), and the total global production of coconuts would keep Heathrow 
going for 18 days (Reguly, 2008). Aware of these problems, Branson pleads that the 
airline industry must ultimately turn to algae in its search for a viable biofuel. Yet 
processing algae, environmentalists caution, ‘may produce more carbon dioxide than is 
saved by using it as an alternative fuel. There are also concerns that algae will compete 
for fresh-water sources as the ponds evaporate and have to be topped up’30. 
There is worse. Not only are biofuels unviable as an aviation fuel, the claims made on 
their behalf as a fuel for road transport face mounting criticism. (Indeed, between this 
article’s submission in summer 2007 and its final edit in spring 2008, these have 
intensified into a clamour). 
3 Biofuels vs. the biosphere 
For all four of our companies, biofuels are an important part – and in some cases the key 
plank – of their climate change mitigation strategy. These four are not exceptions but 
belong to a fuel revolution. McDonald’s in Britain is converting its fleet of trucks to run 
on bio-diesel. Auto-manufacturers, including Volvo and Volkswagen, are heavily 
involved, as are agribusinesses like Tate and Lyle. Political authorities encourage and 
direct the process. In his January 2007, State of the Union speech, President Bush 
proposed a law to mandate a petrol mixture of 20% ethanol over the next ten years. In the 
same month, the European Commission presented its biofuels blueprint, which proposed 
that 10% of transport (excluding aviation) across the EU should be biofuelled by 2020. 
The Commission also plans to direct substantial funds towards biofuels research and 
development. For its part, the British government wants 5% of all transport fuel to be 
produced from crops by 2010. In his final budget as Chancellor, Gordon Brown 
announced he would extend tax rebates for biofuel until 2010. He has personally urged 
train operators to switch to biofuel31. 
Biofuel’s detractors attack it at a number of levels. To start with the most obvious, its 
production competes with food crops. In 2006, more than one-third of the entire US 
maize crop went to ethanol for fuel, a 48% increase over 2005. In 2007 and 2008, the 
shift to biofuels contributed to spikes in food prices that sparked rioting in cities across 
the world, prompting World Bank president Robert Zoellick to voice criticism of the dash 
to biofuel, while Jean Ziegler, the United Nations rapporteur on food rights, went so far 
as to call biofuel production ‘a crime against humanity.’ These problems could well 
worsen. If the EU fails to scrap its target of 10% biofuel in transport, fuel would require 
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the equivalent of 20–40% of Europe’s farmland. A study conducted in 2006 by Sarasin, a 
Swiss bank, placed ‘the present limit for the environmentally and socially responsible use 
of biofuels at roughly 5% of current petrol and diesel consumption in the EU and US,’ 
well below the targets of the EU and many governments (Monbiot, 2007). Furthermore, 
many biofuel feedstocks are heavy consumers of water; and their large-scale cropping 
leads to biodiversity loss, soil erosion and nutrient leaching. More pertinent to this article 
is that biofuels actually exacerbate climate change. Some feedstocks like as maize, can 
emit more CO2 than they save because processing consumes huge amounts of energy. 
Others, notably sugar cane and palm oil, accelerate CO2 release through deforestation and 
soil desiccation. As Doug Parr, chief UK scientist at Greenpeace, argues, ‘If even 5% of 
biofuels are sourced from wiping out existing ancient forests, you have lost all your 
carbon gain’ (Holt-Giménez, 2007). Palm oil planting is the major cause of tropical 
deforestation in both Malaysia and Indonesia: much of the land being cleared is peat 
wetlands, which release carbon as the peat burns. A study by the Dutch scientific 
consultancy Delft Hydraulics found that the decomposing of peatland can release 70–100 
tonnes of CO2 per hectare per year (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2007). The report 
shows that European use of Southeast Asian palm oil would generate upto ten times more 
CO2 than the equivalent emissions from fossil diesel. Indonesia alone is home to 60% of 
all tropical peatlands, and most of these are predicted to be drained in the coming decades 
as a by-product of its plans to increase palm-oil production 43-fold32, releasing over 
40 billion tones of carbon – the equivalent of around six years of global fossil fuel 
emissions. Malaysia, the world’s largest producer of palm oil, has already lost 87% of its 
tropical forests and continues deforesting at a rate of 7% per year (Holt-Giménez,
 
2007). 
Similar is taking place in Africa. Forests covered 40% of Uganda in the 1970s, a figure 
that has slumped to 20% and is now in free fall. Sugar producers are lobbying (and 
allegedly bribing) the government to sanction the destruction of swathes of ostensibly 
protected rainforest. Protestors seeking to prevent this have been shot dead by Ugandan 
police33. In Brazil, sugar cane is mainly grown at some distance from the rainforest – and 
Tesco cites this to justify its reliance upon Brazilian ethanol – but the exponential 
increase in sugar plantations pushes other land users into the forest, while soya, Brazil’s 
other major biofuel crop, is grown on a vast scale in cleared forests, including the 
Amazon (Institute of Science in Society, 2006). Half of Tesco’s bio-diesel is derived 
from palm oil and from soya, a crop that has directly caused the destruction of 21 million 
hectares of forest in Brazil and 14 million in Argentina. According to Dr Philip 
Fearnside, a researcher at Brazil’s National Institute for Amazon Research (GRAIN, 
2007), soya cultivation impacts on deforestation. 
“by consuming cleared land, savannah and transitional forests, thereby pushing 
ranchers and slash-and-burn farmers ever deeper into the forest frontier. 
Soybean farming also provides a key economic and political impetus for new 
highways and infrastructure projects, which accelerate deforestation by other 
actors”. 
Concerns at these problems have prompted biofuel boosters to express concern or to 
switch tack. In April 2008, EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson held firm to the EU 
strategy on biofuels, but advocated a certification scheme to ensure that only 
‘sustainable’ feedstocks are used. This solution, although widely advocated, is a chimera, 
for certification cannot address the fact that increased demand for ‘sustainable’ 
feedstocks raises prices, encouraging increased sales of ‘unsustainable’ feedstocks to less 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    ‘Green shift’: an analysis of corporate responses to climate change 11    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
scrupulous bidders. Others place their hopes in jatropha, a plant that does not require 
chemical fertilizers and need not compete with food crops (for it can be grown on 
marginal land), or to ‘second generation’ biofuels, notably cellulosic ethanol. Sourced 
from woodchips (or ‘biomass waste’), using trees instead of food crops such products, it 
is argued, do not compete with food supplies. Jatropha’s advocates, however, ignore the 
fact that it is a toxic, invasive weed, the yields of which are far higher when grown on 
prime, irrigated land – there have already been reports ‘of farmers being dispossessed of 
fertile land by companies wanting to grow jatropha’ (GRAIN, 2007). As for wood and 
‘biomass waste’34, cellulosic ethanol has yet to demonstrate any carbon savings. To 
become viable, major breakthroughs in plant physiology are required that would permit 
the efficient breakdown of cellulose and lignin. If these succeed, the monoculture tree 
plantations that result will still compete with food crops, deplete the soil and reduce 
ecological diversity. 
Investments in biofuels by BP, Virgin, Tesco et al. will contribute to, and not 
ameliorate, global warming and the degradation of the biosphere. If this is their effect, the 
question arises: whence, then, their recent popularity? To begin with, it is worth recalling 
that the drive to biofuels kicked off in the early 1970s, not over climate change, but as a 
means of addressing the challenges of energy security and price. A second, greater, effort 
came in the late 1990s and 2000s, again for motives of energy security: i.e. to find 
methods of continuing ‘business as usual’ whilst lessening the need to source oil from 
potentially hostile regions. Geopolitics remains of paramount importance. In recent years, 
Washington has created an alliance with Brazil around the ethanol industry that is 
designed to counter Venezuela’s oil-based influence in Latin America. A key figure in 
the US–Brazil alliance is Jeb Bush; he directs the Inter-American Ethanol Commission, 
an organisation charged with boosting the consumption and production of bio-ethanol. 
For industrialists and politicians keen to be seen as green without directly addressing 
the need to reduce emissions, biofuels offer a quick fix. They are assisted in this by the 
terms of the Kyoto agreement, for it allows industrialised countries to claim that their use 
of biofuels reduces greenhouse gas emissions because the gases emitted during their 
production are largely released in countries of the South where Kyoto caps on emissions 
are absent (GRAIN, 2007). For some sectors, the ‘green’ appearance of biofuels is seen 
as justifying their continued expansion. A paradigm case is the automobile industry, for 
which biofuels offer the perfect pre-text for escaping the pressures that might otherwise 
emanate from regulators and public opinion to lower CO2-emission criteria for passenger 
cars or to produce fewer units. In the EU, vehicles firms have been central to the political 
drive towards biofuels. Despite assurances of multiple stakeholder representation, the 
bodies invited to advise the European Commission are dominated by industries with 
biofuels interests: automobiles, oil, energy, biotech, foods and forestry. These 
organisations include the Advisory Research Council for Biofuels (BIOFRAC) and the 
European Biofuels Technology Platform (EBFTP). In the membership of BIOFRAC, the 
automotive industry was represented with more members than any other industry, while 
car companies, alongside oil giants, have the highest representation on EBFTP’s steering 
committee. Its mission is ‘to contribute to the development of cost-competitive world-
class biofuels technologies, to the creation of a healthy biofuels industry and to accelerate 
the deployment of biofuels in the European Union’35. As reported by the Corporate 
Europe Observatory (2007), 
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“Volvo’s Anders Roj chaired BIOFRAC and is now vice-chair of the EBFTP 
Steering committee. Volvo affirms its support for a greenhouse gas reduction 
target of 30% by 2020 for developed countries and for an EU greenhouse 
reduction commitment of 20% by 2020. Yet, at the same time it creates 
vulnerability within the EU economy by threatening relocation: ‘the 
competitiveness of in particular the energy intensive industry must be followed 
to avoid the possible moving out from the EU to third countries’. It also 
supports a binding target for agrofuels of 10% of all vehicle fuels by 2020. This 
is a common corporate strategy, on one hand paying lip service to 
environmental measures while on the other warning that if those measures hit 
their pockets … they will move away from Europe taking their jobs with 
them”. 
According to the newsletter of the EBFTP, the absence of broad representation is 
deliberate: ‘an adequate balance of industry vs. research/public centres was established in 
order to preserve the Platform as an industry-led body,’ and it defines its stakeholders as 
‘organisation[s] whose commercial or business activities’ are affected by biofuels 
development36. 
The biofuel sector, furthermore, offers new areas for business expansion. For 
agribusiness, suffering from low profit rates, government subsidies and mandated targets 
for biofuels are the perfect remedy (Holt-Giménez,
 
2007). Agribusinesses like Cargill are 
heavily involved. British Sugar is too; and it influenced EU policy through its 
membership of BIOFRAC. The biotech industry is also a major investor in biofuels. 
Genetically modified varieties of several crops now used as biofuel crops – maize, soya, 
oilseed rape – have met strong resistance to their use as food. The industry hopes that by 
promoting them as biofuels, and by helping to develop breakthrough ‘second generation’ 
technologies, their products will gain acceptance. Monsanto, Syngenta and others are 
investing heavily in biofuels. Again, biotech firms are policyshapers in the EU: the main 
European biotech lobby group, EuropaBio, was a member of BIOFRAC and is an active 
member of the EBFTP (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2007). Finally, for all this 
investment, finance is needed. Banks, financiers and investment funds are piling into the 
biofuels sector – amongst the pioneers were Goldman Sachs, Barclays and George Soros. 
Together with the other firms listed above, these form a powerful lobby pushing 
governments to support biofuels expansion. 
4 Explaining the green shift 
A recent survey of 350 of the world’s top 500 firms (rated by market capitalisation) 
reveals that ‘climate change and the various regulatory, policy and business responses to 
it are driving what amounts to a worldwide economic and industrial restructuring.’ That 
restructuring, it continues, ‘has already begun to redefine the very basis of competitive 
advantage and financial performance for both companies and their investors’37. Although 
there is no shortage of rhetoric on climate change from PR departments and company 
directors, the flurry of activity in the boardrooms is not entirely cosmetic. Some 
executives are worried that climate chaos will adversely affect business, for example 
through higher insurance premiums or higher crop prices. Some are concerned about its 
impact on long-term growth, and with the instability that it will catalyse, through 
starvation, water shortages and resource wars. Such concerns are undoubtedly genuine. 
When, for example, Tesco’s Terry Leahy counsels that ‘if we fail to mitigate climate 
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change, the consequences for all of us will be severe,’ he means it; (although the 
seriousness with which climate change is treated is variable: a Branson, whose epiphany 
failed to check his activities promoting aviation, space tourism or even the Keep 
Concorde Flying campaign, is not an Al Gore). 
Corporate leader’ recognition of the dangers climate change pose to profitability and 
humanity is not the only reason behind the green shift. Another is alertness to the 
openings associated with it. These divide into two categories. First, there are business 
opportunities associated with climate chaos and its mitigation. ‘The transition to a low-
emissions global economy,’ the Stern review points out (2007), 
“will open many new opportunities across a wide range of industries and 
services. Markets for low carbon energy products are likely to be worth at least 
$500bn per year by 2050, and perhaps much more. Individual companies and 
countries should position themselves to take advantage of these opportunities”. 
Some companies are developing crops resistant to extreme weather, renewables, or 
biofuels. Further down the line, others will find revenues in relocating, reconstructing and 
resupplying flooded or storm-damaged cities, or constructing flood defences. In business, 
first-mover advantage is considerable – witness, for example, the lead over rival electric-
fuel vehicles established by the Toyota Prius. Similarly, states that rapidly incentivise 
investment in low-carbon technologies are likely to see ‘their’ businesses reap large 
rewards. Secondly, as concern over climate change advances, opportunities associated 
with green branding swell. That a green image boosts sales has long been a staple in 
business-studies literature. ‘The environment is the vehicle to greater profits in the 
1990s,’ Managing Service Quality told its readers over a decade ago (Denton, 1996); 
“organizations should comply with customer demands, [for], recent surveys 
show, consumers are willing to pay more for environmentally-friendly 
products. [Conversely], surveys by Gallup suggest that about half of their 
respondents in a 1990 poll stopped buying particular products because of the 
poor environmental image of the company … The message is clear: companies 
need to make environmental concerns a top priority because consumers report 
that the environmental attributes of a product or service play a significant role 
in which products they buy and which they avoid. … Companies which see the 
environment as a cost, rather than a chance to gain a competitive advantage, are 
missing the best opportunity of the 1990s”. 
Other surveys have suggested that a sizeable proportion of consumers are sufficiently 
committed to environmental goals that they are willing to pay a premium of at least 10% 
for ‘green’ products. 
Knowledge of such trends is, of course, ABC in company boardrooms. As Terry 
Leahy (2007) frames the matter, if Tesco becomes ‘a leader in helping to create a 
low-carbon economy’ and gains recognition ‘as a centre of expertise in how to run 
a green business, … [it] will be rewarded with more custom and more loyalty and as a 
result will grow stronger.’ It is safe to predict that these tendencies will strengthen. ‘The 
branding of nature,’ a recent article in Marketing Intelligence and Planning goes so far as 
to forecast, is ‘a promising direction for research and practice. In societies in which 
nature experiences are becoming scarce while life becomes increasingly ‘virtual’ … the 
consumption of green products may serve as a substitute for real contact with 
nature’(Hartmann and Ibáñez, 2006). 
The standard explanation of the corporate green shift is that environmentally 
concerned consumers buy green, and because marginal differences in image translate into 
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large differences in turnover, rendering companies highly accountable to their customers, 
‘going green’ becomes a vital brand asset. For this mechanism to be environmentally 
meaningful, however, customers must recognise ‘green’ behaviour, and there are grounds 
for doubting that they do. To give one example of fooled consumers that stands for many, 
some German utilities are tapping into a rapidly growing eco-conscious market simply by 
relabelling the electricity which they have for decades supplied from hydroelectric 
stations as ‘special green energy’ – which consumers, understandably but falsely, assume 
to derive from new investment in renewables. A recent report by WPP suggests that 
although 80% of consumers believe it is important that companies act in an 
environmentally friendly way, their understanding of what it means to be green is 
‘shallow, confused and easily swayed by company messages’38. The same survey found 
that the top 20 ‘green brands’ included many surprising names, none more so than Shell, 
whose operations have in recent years become markedly more carbon intensive due to 
investments in Albertan tar sands and Chinese coal mining. 
An alternative reading argues that the green shift is mostly ‘greenwash’. Perhaps the 
most sophisticated version of this case has been elaborated by Heather Rogers. Given the 
severity of the contemporary ecological crisis, she observes, cultivating a green image 
becomes more demanding. Opinion polls show that while consumers are more likely to 
buy a product from a company that is known to have environmentally friendly practices, 
most will be guided primarily by cost and few will research a company’s environmental 
record. The upshot is that although corporations profit from a green image, 
“because fewer consumers actually buy eco-safe products, and an even smaller 
number delve into the reality of a company’s practices, there is no need to truly 
transform production. Firms can cash in by merely jumping through the right 
hoops, which today include environmental claims certified by a third party, 
corporate investment in ‘green’ projects in partnership with non-profit 
environmental organizations, and offering eco-oriented consumer products”. 
Eco-commerce, Rogers concludes (2007), ‘is a means for capital as a whole to avoid truly 
remaking itself, while giving the opposite impression. This misperception helps capital 
continue cultivating the ideology of individual responsibility linked to a market-based 
solution, pre-empting government regulation.’ 
The pre-emption – or influencing – of government regulation provides a further clue 
as to the nature and timing of the green shift. In early 2007, two articles in the US 
business press highlighted the changing attitude of US corporations to climate-change 
regulation. Companies are ‘coming to the bargaining table for many reasons beyond the 
science,’ reported Business Week (Carey, 2007); 
“On Apr. 2 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection 
Agency can regulate CO2 as a pollutant. That could bring legal challenges and 
EPA-imposed mandatory curbs. ‘The fear that the next Administration’s EPA 
would have its hand on the lever is a great motivator,’ says Natural Resources 
Defense Council attorney David D. Doniger. Plus, a growing patchwork of 
state carbon-emissions limits has prompted industries to push for a preemptive 
national law. And as energy executives face decisions, such as what kind of 
power plants to build for the next 40 years, they want regulatory certainty”. 
There will be regulation, CEOs recognise, and, before a law is drafted that overly 
prejudices their interests, they push ‘pre-emptively’ for business-friendly laws. The 
second piece, from The Wall Street Journal (Murray, 2007), extends the argument. 
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Corporate leaders, it observes, recognise that limits on carbon dioxide emissions are now 
inevitable; 
Indeed, they are already in place in Europe and coming soon to California and 
the Northeast. Better to get the federal government on board, they argue, so 
businesses can plan for the future. That’s an especially potent argument for 
utilities, which have to make investment decisions today about serving 
customers 30–50 years down the road. … The 2006 election was a wake-up call 
for business leaders, reminding them they won’t always have a business-
friendly government to protect them on this issue. … Business leaders who sign 
on early will likely have more influence in crafting the all-important details of 
any legislation, which could determine who wins and who loses. … In addition, 
CEOs are finding that a green hue helps keep them in good stead with 
employees, some activist investors and an environmentally conscious public. 
At a time when CEOs rank low in the public’s esteem, many are happy for a 
chance to burnish their public profile. 
Regulation inevitably privileges some interests over others. Therefore, the more prescient 
business leaders are saying, let’s get early to the negotiating tables at which 
policymakers, corporations and international civil servants thrash out the rules. 
The question is, what sort of framework – nationally and internationally – will govern 
the climate change regime? Will it be regulation-heavy? Will it be geared around 
taxation? Or will it be ‘regulation lite,’ organised through markets? Survey evidence 
suggests that most British businesses see government regulation as the most efficacious 
method of reducing emissions. Somewhat fewer believe taxes and tax breaks are key, 
while ‘fewer than half thought voluntary agreements and market trading schemes were 
effective environmental tools’39. This finding sits uneasily with the fact that the business 
sector has lobbied en bloc for a market regime and against heavier regulation. Why is 
this? Could it be that the promotion of ‘regulation lite’ arises from the attempt to square 
the imperative of tackling climate change with that of increasing profitability? There is 
certainly evidence to suggest that once a substantial regulatory framework became 
inevitable business leaders spotted a rent-seeking opportunity, a means by which the 
threat, while being formally acknowledged, could be reformulated to their advantage. 
5 Carbon trading: of lemons and low-hanging fruit 
Climate change policymaking since the mid-1990s, Matthews and Paterson (2005), have 
argued persuasively has essentially consisted of ‘attempts to construct policies that create 
new sites of accumulation.’ These include renewable energy (stimulating an existing 
market) and, more importantly, emissions trading (the creation of new markets and 
commodities). In the western USA, the EU, and at the global level, the policy regime 
centres on creating markets in emissions. The theory behind this momentous initiative is 
that the problem is a consequence of ‘market failure,’ i.e. that scarce resource (like clean 
air) will be excessively used or otherwise mistreated in the absence of appropriate 
market-mediated price signals. The term ‘market failure’ is predicated on the neoclassical 
assumption that the norm is a free market system and laissez-faire government; that if 
political intervention is required this should be taken as a signal that markets have not yet 
been properly constructed. Hence, the need for market expansion: the right to pollute 
must become a commodity; atmospheric pollution requires valorising. One early 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was launched by the EU in 2005, involving some 
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11,500 installations. It connects into two others that were inaugurated following 
negotiations at Kyoto: the CDM and the Joint Implementation Mechanism. As these 
markets become actualised, growing numbers of corporations recognise their inevitability 
and consider how to play them and – for these are highly politicised markets – how to 
lobby for favourable terms. 
The advocates of carbon trading justify it in terms of efficiency: it allows the cheapest 
cost of reducing emissions to be found. The market sets a price for the right to emit one 
tonne of CO2 (or other greenhouse gases); if the price is high enough, companies will find 
ways to cut emissions. Market schemes thus encourage the development of innovative 
abatement technologies – unlike a carbon tax, which, according to Mark Maslin (2004), 
‘provides an incentive only to adjust production levels, which generally benefits neither 
business nor society.’ But criticisms of emissions trading abound. Problems arise from 
the fact that measurements, largely provided by the emitters themselves, are notoriously 
‘flexible’. A Christian Aid report in 2007 revealed that Britain’s biggest businesses failed 
to disclose almost 200 million tonnes of emissions – more than the entire annual 
emissions of Pakistan and Greece combined – significantly affecting the extent of 
Britain’s perceived contribution to global warming40. Only 16 of Britain’s top 100 listed 
companies currently meet even the most elementary official emissions reporting 
guidelines. This is an inherent and general problem of emissions trading. As the 
Transnational Institute and Carbon Trade Watch point out (McGarr, 2005), such markets 
“in effect privatise the problem of air-pollution. Government and communities 
lose control over environmental protections, placing it in the hands of the 
polluters. When the incentive to reduce emissions is profit and cost-
effectiveness, there is incredible pressure to cheat by overestimating reductions, 
while underestimating emissions.” 
Both buyers and sellers of carbon credits have an interest in inflating the number 
generated by any given project. ‘With a bit of judicious accounting,’ Lohmann observes, 
‘a company investing in foreign ‘carbon-saving’ projects can increase fossil emissions 
both at home and abroad while claiming to make reductions in both locations.’ As a result 
of the absence of accurate verification, ‘the project-based credit market runs the risk of 
becoming what George Akerlof calls a self-destructing ‘lemons market.’’ The quality of 
the goods traded being uncertain, ‘lemons’ can be readily off-loaded onto the market ‘and 
buyers won’t pay the prices demanded by sellers of higher-quality products’ (Lohmann, 
2006). 
As with the offsets discussed above, carbon markets enable corporations to earn 
credits by sponsoring schemes elsewhere that supposedly reduce emissions. In such 
cases, a credit can be earned based on a calculation of the hypothetical difference 
between what has happened and what might otherwise have occurred. These credits can 
then be used to increase the corporation’s own emissions without facing a penalty. Such 
schemes are open to abuse over who decides what would otherwise have transpired and 
who performs the resulting calculation. The CDM, writes Paul McGarr (2005), allows a 
corporation to 
“sponsor a plantation in a poor country, and claim that if this hadn’t been done 
more carbon dioxide would have gone into the atmosphere, on the grounds that 
trees lock up carbon. Another example could be a corporation investing in 
some electricity generation project involving, say, hydroelectric power and 
dams, and claiming that otherwise fossil fuels would have been burned and put 
more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere.” 
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Far from providing real alternatives to fossil-fuel consumption, schemes of this sort 
simply sanction emissions expansion. 
In Larry Lohmann’s important treatise on carbon trading (2006), a persuasive case is 
made that markets do not in fact represent an efficient method of reducing emissions. The 
essential flaw is that carbon trading treats every tonne of carbon alike. Leaving aside any 
social justice implications (the same price is assigned to ‘basic needs CO2’ as to ‘luxuries 
CO2’), this negates efficiency, for savings made by introducing a radical new renewable 
technology or way of organising social life that would lead to vastly multiplied future 
cuts are deemed equal to those stemming from routine efficiency improvements that 
should have been made long ago. The cuts made today will influence the potential for 
future reductions, Lohmann points out, but markets reward the cheapest, rather than those 
with the most effective long-term consequences. He gives the example of a company that 
could either reduce emissions by installing an end-of-pipe technology, necessitating an 
initial outlay of 100,000 followed by 1,000 per year in operational costs, or, for 200,000, 
re-engineer its entire industrial process in a way that reduces its need for fossil fuels, 
generating cost savings of 1,000 per year. The latter solution would be better for the 
climate and, over the long run, cheaper. Yet a company choosing the former would 
benefit most from a trading system, by selling permits cheaply during the initial years. 
Emissions trading even provide incentives for those polluters for which introducing 
emissions-reducing technological changes are more expensive not to reduce emissions: 
the rational choice for them, rather, is to buy permits. The effect is to discriminate against 
costlier forms of innovation, even if they are more effective. A further drawback is that 
the accounting procedures in carbon trading actually set up perverse incentives for carbon 
project proponents to emit more greenhouse gases today in order that their projects 
appear to save more tomorrow. 
In practice, the record of carbon trading has been dismal. The EU ETS was the first 
fully functioning trading scheme and, given the advantages that accrue to ‘first-movers,’ 
Brussels is a keen proponent of the universalisation of such schemes. However, already 
in its early stages, only a minority of companies believed that it would result in any 
emissions reductions, and they were right (Lohmann, 2006). Lacking the political will to 
tackle big emitters, the European Commission over-allocated carbon permits. British 
firms, for example, were given the rights to emit as much as they had in the previous five 
years (Lohmann, 2006). The price of permits went into free fall. 
The biggest gains from the EU ETS have been scored by corporations with large 
allocations which can effect emissions cuts and sell permits when the price is high, and 
then expand emissions when it falls. The system, Michael Dorsey has revealed, 
‘financially rewarded companies – mainly petroleum, natural gas and electricity 
generators – that disproportionately emit carbon dioxide. … In fall 2006, a Citigroup 
report concluded that the continent’s biggest polluters had been the winners, with 
consumers the losers’41. In particular, energy companies benefited, because they 
incorporate the market value of permits – which they receive gratis – into the price of 
their product. A 2005 report by IPA Energy Consulting found that Britain’s six electricity 
generators stood to earn some £800m in each of the first three years of the scheme, while 
the EU’s four biggest power firms, according to Germany’s Environment Minister, 
profited from the first round of the ETS to the tune of €6–8 billion. The next round of the 
ETS looks no more promising than the first. By 2012, utilities in Britain and four other 
European countries stand to gain windfall profits of up to €71bn, despite investing 
heavily in new coal-fired power plants (Gow, 2008). The irrationality of the ETS has 
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been demonstrated by a number of recent studies, the most striking of which, by Ben 
Schlemmermeier, director of the LBD consultancy in Berlin, and Professor Hans-Peter 
Schwintowski, Director of the Institute for Energy and Competition Law at Humboldt 
University, showed that, in 2005, German consumers paid €1100 for each tonne of CO2 
saved through the ETS, a figure that was projected to rise in 2007 and 2008 to over 
€2000. An equivalent volume saved by investing in renewable energy, the same report 
demonstrated, costs only €5742. 
When one turns to the global level, i.e. to the Kyoto schemes, one discovers criticisms 
that are similar and no less serious. To begin with, the targets are set very low: the cuts in 
emissions that Kyoto envisages, even if fully implemented, will do virtually nothing to 
halt global warming. Kyoto does not include aviation emissions, and allows forest and 
agricultural land to be counted as carbon sinks, which may save some forest from 
destruction, but at the price of sanctioning the principle that such practices are valid – and 
profitable – alternatives to emissions reduction. As with the EU ETS, Kyoto’s rules allow 
corporations in developed countries to exceed emissions targets by buying carbon credits 
or investing in offset schemes which – as in the case of Jindal discussed above – 
frequently reduce only hypothetical emissions. In theory, a country will ‘be able to meet 
100% of its Kyoto reduction commitments through purchasing credits in the market 
rather than reducing climate change emissions at source’43. A further problem with this 
and other ETS is their operating costs. Pace Maslin, the same or superior effects could be 
achieved at far lower administrative expense through a tax on non-renewable energy. A 
carbon tax is seen even by many neo-liberal economists, such as Martin Wolf of the 
Financial Times, as a more efficient means of encouraging businesses to develop low 
carbon emissions technology44. 
There is growing recognition that the carbon trading experiment has failed. Quoting 
Tom Burke of environment lobby group E3G, a recent Reuters report (Lovell, 2007) puts 
it starkly: 
“The policy instrument of choice pretty well everywhere is a price for carbon, 
and it is not going to work, … the vital incentive is supposed to be provided by 
achieving a high price for carbon, from which all else would follow. Neither 
has happened and time is running out”. 
Oxford University economics professor Dieter Helm concurs (Lovell, 2007): ‘The price 
of carbon has had virtually no effect on the market so far and virtually no effect on 
climate change.’ Together, the EU and Kyoto schemes have generated a global carbon 
trade worth billions of dollars but have had a negligible effect on emissions. Evidence 
collected by the Guardian (Davies, 2007) suggests that, to date, 
“both markets have earned fortunes for speculators and for some of the 
companies which produce most greenhouse gases and yet, through a 
combination of teething troubles and multiple forms of malpractice and 
possibly fraud, they have delivered little or no benefit for the environment”. 
Yet the problem lies deeper than teething troubles and fraud. Quite simply, as Jim 
Watson of Sussex University’s Energy Group points out, ‘If you rely too much on the 
carbon price you give people the option of buying their way out of it.’ The oil price 
shocks of the 1970s, he adds (Lovell, 2007), ‘didn’t wean us off oil, so why should we 
believe that a high carbon price will wean us off carbon?’ 
As to how this sorry situation could arise, the answer lies in part in prevailing neo-
liberal assumptions: that the response to market failure is market expansion, that 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    ‘Green shift’: an analysis of corporate responses to climate change 19    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
addressing climate change requires commodifying the right to pollute. But it also results 
from corporate support for market solutions. In this, BP’s John Browne was a pioneer. 
His environmentally conscious image notwithstanding, he was ever careful to warn that 
investing too heavily in green processes and products would be foolhardy – ‘Business is 
about doing business, it’s not a surrogate for government or public service’ (Anon. 2006). 
Climate change, he foresaw, would bring money-making opportunities. In 2000, BP 
pledged to reduce its carbon emissions by 10%, and introduced an internal trading system 
to this end. This did help the company make the easy one-third of the cuts required 
relatively cheaply but, in attempting to make the more difficult cuts, it found it cheaper to 
avoid more radical change through offsetting. By 2002, Lohmann reports (2006), ‘the 
company expected half of its so-called ‘emissions reductions’ to come from credits 
bought in from outside. At no point was there any move toward genuinely innovative 
technology.’ In spite of this unpromising experience, BP has strongly supported the 
generalisation of emissions trading to the global system. The reason for this, one cannot 
but suspect, is venal: carbon trading systems offer a fertile ground for rent-seeking, i.e. 
harvesting values through manipulation of the economic environment, with investment in 
lawyers, lobbying, PR campaigns and accountants (because emissions-trading regulators 
must rely on private firms for information) rather than producing and selling commodities 
(Lohmann, 2006). The outcome for BP and for other big polluters, has been a triumph. 
As Homan Jenkins reports, in the Wall Street Journal, 
“General Electric, DuPont, Alcoa, Caterpillar and other industrial pigpens this 
week endorsed cap-and-trade limits on carbon dioxide, which would turn their 
established habit of using the atmosphere as a free waste disposal into a 
property right, worth billions. Talk about a low-hanging fruit. They are 
accustomed to treating carbon dumping as a gimme. Now they’d at least be in a 
position to get paid for dumping less. Their hero is retiring BP chief John 
Browne, who turned his little oil company into a big oil company, engaged in 
cost cutting (which he called ‘emissions cuts’) and set about using public policy 
to get his shareholders compensated twice for these cuts”45. 
As emissions markets become generalised, vested interests build up in support of them, 
forming obstacles to radical reform. ‘The trouble is,’ Burke laments (Lovell, 2007), ‘there 
are a lot of people out there making a lot of money out of carbon trading and who want to 
perfect the market rather than press for the changes that are actually needed.’ 
6 Conclusions 
In recent years, elite thinking on climate change has been transformed. The dominant 
strategy for many years was denial, masked as ‘scepticism,’ and was committed to 
preventing the formation of an effective policy regime. It is now eclipsed by a new 
approach. Exemplified by the likes of BP, M&S and Virgin, corporations are investing in 
renewables, biofuels, offsets, waste reduction and/or carbon labelling, and are influencing 
public policy through advising, lobbying and campaigning. Amongst the reasons for this 
‘green shift,’ I would include the dawning awareness of many corporate executives that 
global warming is a major problem, one that may adversely affect business prospects and 
will certainly generate social problems and political instability. As recognition grows of 
the business opportunities associated with climate chaos and with attempts to mitigate it, 
of the benefits of green branding and securing a better position at negotiating tables on 
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environment-related policy, a critical mass is reached when large numbers of companies 
perceive a strong need to be seen as green. 
The green shift has taken on its distinctive contours due to the attempt by soi-disant 
green CEOs – Branson, Rupert Murdoch and their ilk – to square their concern for the 
environment with the need to perform for shareholders. The shift has enabled corporate 
and political elites to co-opt and control discussion on climate change, and to construct a 
policy framework that does little to reduce emissions, but provides them with further 
opportunities. The ‘black’ in Leahy’s slogan – ‘green is the new black’ – references not 
only environmental vogue, but also the colour of the company’s accounts. The argument 
of this article is that narrow financial considerations act as trump cards, keeping climate-
change mitigation strategies to those that are compatible with ‘business as usual.’ On 
closer examination, these were shown to be far less impressive than they appear, 
frequently guilty of spin or barefaced deception, and in many cases actually harmful – or, 
as with carbon labelling, marginally helpful but contributing to counterproductive 
phenomena like the individualisation of ecological problems. Too often, green rhetoric 
obscures quite different motives: How can we steal a march on rivals?, What enzymes 
can we patent that might be crucial for second generation biofuels? and the like. For 
corporate executives and politicians alike, the mentality involved is too often a 
complacent faith in technology: the problem can be solved through new or improved 
products or energy saving (A representative example is Tony Blair’s justification of the 
expansion of long-range air travel: ‘I think we need to look at how you make air travel 
more energy efficient, how you develop the new fuels that will allow us to burn less 
energy and emit less. … for example … the new frames for aircraft, they are far more 
energy efficient’46). But, the most egregious example of narrow business interests 
trumping ecological rationality occurs in the engineering of a policy framework that has 
fashioned the Earth’s carbon-cycling capacity into property rights that are awarded to the 
corporate sector, including the most high-polluting corporations. The undignified 
spectacle of competitive rent-seeking witnessed in the EU and Kyoto trading schemes has 
enriched the big emitters but does nothing to prevent climate chaos. The current market-
centred policy regime is counterproductive. A more effective and more just strategy 
would involve concerted state intervention focused upon investment in public transport, 
housing and renewable energy, coupled with regulatory measures to radically reduce 
fossil-fuel use. 
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